Using a matched employer-employee dataset on the French manufacturing sector in the 1990s, we investigate how training incidence responds to technical and organizational changes across age groups.
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The prospect of a rapidly ageing workforce in OECD countries raises decisive issues. Will it reduce innovation and growth? How will retirement behavior evolve, and in particular, will older workers work longer? Answers to such questions depend on whether older workers will be able to adapt to an environment of rapid technical and organizational changes. This paper takes a first step on this issue, by asking whether older workers receive more or less training when they are working in firms that undergo major technical and organizational changes. Specifically, we investigate training responses to technical and organizational changes in different age groups, using a matched employer-employee dataset relating to the French manufacturing sector in the 1990s. We use a difference-in-difference approach, comparing training incidence across age groups, in firms with more or less advanced technology and organizational practices. We separately consider training in the main task, training in computer skills and training in teamwork.
We find some evidence that older workers have a comparative disadvantage for training in contexts of technical change, but the evidence is limited to low-skill occupations, and we do not find that organizational change has similar effects. Specifically, using younger workers as a comparison group, we find that, in such low-skill occupations as clerks and blue-collar workers, those older than 50 suffer from reduced training incidence when firms implement advanced information technologies. Yet we also find that training responses are not systematically unfavorable to older workers: in particular, new organizational practices do not affect training incidence differently for older workers than for younger workers.
The main contribution of our paper is to put training at the forefront of the analysis of the literature on 'age-biased' technical change. Training can indeed be viewed as the missing link in the emerging literature suggesting that besides being skill biased, technical and organizational changes may be age biased against older workers. A first group of articles in that literature shows that older workers are slightly slower to adopt such innovating tools as computers. FRIEDBERG [2003] shows that successive cohorts of workers in the United States adopted computers at all ages, with a slight slowdown for workers close to retirement, which she interprets as the effect of a shorter payback period for computer training. WEINBERG [2004] shows that this slight slowdown covers sharp contrasts between high school graduates, whose computer use actually increases with experience, and college graduates, who adopt computers more towards the beginning of their careers. The picture is completed by KONING AND GELDERBLOM [2006] : using Dutch data, they show that not only does the share of 3/37 workers using computers slowly fall with age, but the number and the complexity of tasks performed on computers also decrease. Overall, this first strand of literature finds some evidence that older workers have difficulties adopting computers, although the effect of age is perhaps weaker than expected. This may partly be due to a selection bias, if those older workers who were the least likely to adopt new tools have left the labor force.
1 A second strand of literature focuses on the effects of technical and organizational changes on the employment of older workers. BARTEL AND SICHERMAN [1993] find that persistently higher (industry-specific) rates of technical change induce older workers to retire later, whereas unexpected accelerations in the pace of change induce them to retire earlier. They interpret these results as evidence that training, as a long-run response to technical change, creates an incentive to retire later, whereas early retirement is the short-run response when workers have not received training in time. AUBERT, CAROLI AND ROGER [2006] estimate the impact of new technologies and new organizational practices on the labor demand for various age groups.
Ceteris paribus, the wage bill share of older workers decreases in computerized firms with an innovative organization. Interestingly, in most of the above articles, the ability of older workers to take advantage of changes through training plays a key role in the interpretation of the results. In addition, views are contrasted: FRIEDBERG [2003] and AUBERT et al. [2006] tend to consider that older workers have a comparative disadvantage for training, whereas BARTEL AND SICHERMAN [1993] hold a more optimistic view. Overall, while these two strands of literature bring some support to the age-bias hypothesis, they also show the necessity to investigate training responses in more depth.
Our analysis thus deals with one of the key possible causes of age-biased technical changes: a supposed comparative disadvantage of older workers with regard to training in new technologies. It improves on previous descriptive work in BEHAGHEL [2006] . First, we use an original strategy to control for workers' selection: we construct proxies for individual workers' characteristics from a unique panel data set with worker data available since 1976, and use these proxies as controls for unobserved heterogeneity in the training equations.
Second, we test the robustness of the results to alternative measures of technical and organizational changes used in the literature, although we would argue that our synthetic measures are more comprehensive. Last, we connect our results to the literature on the adoption of innovative tools, showing that the fact that older workers in lower occupations 1 Selection is an important issue for older workers, as in many countries a significant share of older workers leaves the labor force before the legal (or usual) age of retirement. In France, for instance, 42% of men and 54% of women aged 55 to 59 were either unemployed or had left the labor force by 2002.
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receive less computer training is not simply due to the fact that they are fewer to use computers, but also to the fact that there are fewer computer trainees among older workers using computers.
A clear limitation of our work -like most empirical papers in the literature on skill-biased and age-biased technical changes -is that, due to the lack of convincing instruments, a causal interpretation of the results rests on strong, untested assumptions. The key assumption needed in our case is the standard assumption of a difference in differences: comparing older vs.
younger workers in firms with advanced vs. less advanced technology, we interpret the coefficient of the interaction of age and technology as evidence of age-biased technical change. This amounts to assuming that there is nothing else that can explain differences in age training profiles between firms with more or less advanced technologies. We acknowledge that alternative interpretations are plausible. For instance, it may be the case that unobservable characteristics of the management drive technology adoption and are correlated with prejudices against older workers. Though imperfect, we believe that our test brings interesting evidence on the role played by training in the age bias hypothesis. Presumably the most interesting finding lies in the contrasts between low-skill and high-skill occupations. It suggests that age and the shorter career horizon do not constitute a systematic barrier to training. Rather the difficulties faced by older low-skill workers are consistent with the view that they lack the basic computer literacy that is a prerequisite for training in advanced IT.
The article is organized as follows: Section 1 outlines the empirical strategy, Section 2 introduces the data, and results appear in Section 3, followed by concluding comments in Section 4.
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Empirical approach
Our key empirical question is whether older workers suffer from a lower access to training in firms using advanced technologies and/or implementing innovative organizational practices.
Formally, we would like to estimate the following model: France. To deal with the omitted variable bias that this selection may induce, we rely on a proxy variable approach. As detailed in the data section below, we are able to build proxies for individual productive characteristics (namely, wage fixed effects at previous employers' and attachment to private sector employment). We use these proxies as controls in the training equations: if they are sufficiently correlated with the relevant unobservable individual characteristics, this should remove the omitted variable bias.
Abstracting from i ν , let us now consider our approach to the firms' unobserved effect, j µ . If we had a sufficient number of workers per firm, we would estimate the model within firms using fixed effects methods. A drawback of this, however, is that our data actually samples only one worker in every four firms (see data section below): one fourth of the observations would therefore be lost, and sample selectivity issues would arise. Our approach rather follows from a difference-in-difference strategy. To illustrate this in a simple way, let us assume that we have only two age categories and only two types of firms depending on the technology at use (the same reasoning would hold with organizational practices). Old is 1 for 6/37 older workers, and Comp is 1 for firms with advanced IT (and 0 otherwise), and model (1) simplifies to:
Grouping firm-worker matches in four categories according to age (younger / older) and to the technology at use in the firm (advanced / less advanced), consider the following difference-in-differences:
Therefore, the difference-in-differences identifies the parameter of interest, β , if and only if the following assumption holds:
, a condition that would be violated if, for instance, firms that train their workers more tend to keep them longer, and therefore to have an older workforce. Assumption (3) allows for older workers to be overrepresented (or underrepresented) in firms that train their workers more; but it requires this to be the case in firms that use advanced technology in the same way as in firms that do not use advanced IT.
In practice, we do not compute β from the empirical analog to the above equation: we need to introduce covariates (in particular, proxies for the workers' individual effects), and the fact that the training variable is binary suggests using a latent variable model. We use a probit model: Finally, as detailed below, note that the model is estimated separately for different measures of training incidence, and for workers in higher and lower occupations.
The Data
We use two matched data sources. The data on the technology, the organizational practices, and the incidence of training comes from a French survey on organizational changes and computerization (Changements Organisationnels et Informatisation, COI) conducted at the end of 1997. The data used to control for selection comes from exhaustive social security records.
The COI survey is a matched employer-employee survey (see GREENAN AND MAIRESSE [1999] and the data appendix for a general presentation). We work with a random sample of about 2,500 manufacturing firms that completed a self-administered questionnaire on the use of information technologies and new managerial tools in 1994 and 1997. Small samples of employees (1 to 4) with at least one year of seniority have been randomly selected within each firm and interviewed, in the context of their homes, on workplace organization, technology 8/37
use and training, which yields a sample of about 4,500 workers. The employee-level survey allows measuring the incidence of three types of training 2 : training in the main task, in computer skills, and in teamwork. Workers were asked the following questions: "in addition to your initial training, did your firm provide you with specific training in your current task?", "did you receive specific training to teamwork?", and "in addition to your initial training, did your firm provide you with specific training in your current task on computer?" From these three questions, we built three binary variables of training incidence. The questions were asked independently in different parts of the questionnaire and we use the three variables separately in the analyses. The questions about training in computers (respectively in teamwork) are asked only to workers who work on computers (respectively in teams). We assume that the other workers did not receive training in computer skills (respectively teamwork) and set the corresponding training variables to 0. We found this preferable to censoring the sample, as censoring would be endogenous, given that computer use may depend on the profitability of computer training. However, we will also consider a nested logit model for computers that distinguishes three groups of workers: those who do not use computers, those who use them without specific training, and those who use them and get specifically trained.
Note that the survey does not specify the period on which training incidence is reported. It may concern any training session provided by the employer. As such, training incidence rates are therefore not comparable across age groups if older workers have held their current job for longer. This leads us to control for seniority (tenure at the current employer) in our analyses of training incidence. Interestingly, adding tenure to the controls amplifies the drop in training incidence for workers above 50, but it has no effect on the comparison between firms with more or less advanced technology and/or organizational practices. Finally, we use social security records of the employees' work history (the DADS administrative panel) to build proxies of the workers' productivity. The DADS data covers all private employment periods, starting in 1976. This unique data source has been used in several studies of wage careers (in particular, by ABOWD, KRAMARZ AND MARGOLIS [1999] ).
We use it to build two measures of individual productive characteristics. A first variable describes attachment to private sector employment. It is based on the total time spent outside of private employment between the first year the worker has been observed and the date of the survey (1997). As the source covers all private firms and as movements between the public and the private sectors are the exception (French civil servants benefit from lifetime employment by the government), these periods of absence are most likely non-employment 10/37 period (out of the labor force or unemployed). More precisely, we build our first proxy as the opposite of the ratio of the time spent away from private employment over the number of years since the worker entered employment (or since 1976 if the worker entered employment before 1976). Hence, high values in the indicator suggest a high attachment to employment.
We interpret this as a proxy of high productivity for two reasons: first, the worker has accumulated more experience, and second, if firms fire the less productive workers in priority, having spent less time in unemployment signals higher ability. The second proxy is more standard, being a wage fixed effect from a Mincerian wage regression -call it the individual wage fixed effect. It is estimated in a covariance analysis of log wages controlling for education, gender, experience, industry, and time effects. The estimation is done for the period before the worker enters the firm that employs him or her in 1997 and that answers the firm-level COI survey. Indeed, we want to distinguish these individual characteristics of the worker from the characteristics of his or her current firm. The two proxies may depend on age by construction, and so we allow for interactions with age in the analyses. of workers), slightly less frequent among older workers. More advanced firms train their workers more frequently; at this level of aggregation, the increase does not seem to vary across age groups. In addition, the incidence of training in computer skills and in teamwork increases with age and with the use of advanced IT and new organizational practices. The education data shows strong cohort effects, as younger generations are more educated. More educated workers also seem more frequent among firms with advanced IT and new organizational practices, whereas new technologies and new organizational practices are more frequent in large firms. Those large firms have larger populations of older workers. Finally, average tenure is somewhat higher in more advanced firms, which are also less frequently rural. Overall, these descriptive statistics show strong composition effects relating to firm size and to education levels. In the econometric analysis, we will control for these effects by introducing education and firm size indicators interacted with age.
The correlation coefficients in panel B show that there is no simple pattern connecting the age structure of the workforce to the use of new organizational practices and advanced technologies. By contrast, training correlates positively with the use or adoption of new organizational practices and advanced IT.
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The Results
We start with two simple probit models of training incidence, generalizing the probit model of Section 1 to four age groups instead of two:
where T is a binary variable indicating whether the worker has received training, Orga and
Comp are measures of the firm's organization and technology; d a is a dummy variable for age group a (30-39 year-old, 40-49 year-old and 50-59 year-old). Model 1 is estimated without controlling for composition effects. Model 2 controls for the worker's education (interacted with age group) and for his or her tenure in the firm (we distinguish four five-year tenure groups below twenty years of seniority, and one group for those with more than 20 years of tenure), for the size of the firm (interacted with the worker's age group), for the plant's localization (rural vs. urban) and for the frequency of early retirement in the industry.
Controlling for early retirement is necessary as retiring early is a widespread practice in the French manufacturing sector and it may have an impact on training incidence by reducing the worker's career horizon. 4 The plant localization may also matter if urban firms find it easier than rural firms to hire the skills they need on the external labor market rather than to train their existing workforce. Table A1 contains descriptive statistics on all these control variables.
Models 1 and 2 are estimated separately for two occupational groups: managers and technicians/supervisors on the one hand, clerks and blue-collar workers on the other, and for three types of training: training in the main task, in computer skills, and in teamwork. [2006] ). However, it should be kept in mind that they may partly overestimate this complementarity, as they may be spuriously driven by unobserved firm heterogeneity.
Our focus is on the interaction effects between the age group indicators and the Orga and
Comp variables. Here again, results strongly differ by types of changes and types of training.
There is no evidence of differences by age for training in the main task: none of the interaction coefficients is significant. By contrast, we find significant and sizeable differences for training in computer skills and, to a lesser extent, training in teamwork. Specifically, workers above 50 in firms with advanced IT suffer from a 14 pp reduction in training in computer skills compared to what is predicted by the main effects of age and IT. They witness a 9.8 pp increase in firms with innovative organizational practices. 5 We view the 14 pp reduction in training in computer skills as the key result of this paper. Interpreted causally, it suggests that older unskilled workers suffer from a comparative disadvantage to training in computer skills, so that firms using advanced IT prefer to focus their training investments on younger workers. By contrast, these workers receive additional computer training in firms 5 One may fear that the opposite coefficients on Orga and Comp at age 50-59 are due to multicollinearity. This is however not the case. Although Orga and Comp are positively correlated (the correlation coefficient is .62), their effects can be separated. We checked that if we remove Orga from the estimation, the coefficients on Comp keep the same pattern. The interaction terms remain significant at the 1% level.
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introducing new organizational practices. We are not sure how to interpret the latter result.
One interpretation would be that the type of training needed to accompany organizational changes is more accessible to older workers -unfortunately, we do not have data on the content of the training in computer skills to test this hypothesis.
Turning to managers and technicians/supervisors (panel B), we find much less dramatic effects. Once controls are introduced, there is no significant difference in responses by age (the interaction effects are never statistically significant). This suggests that age is less decisive for driving training responses. One possible but partial explanation for that may lay in the quite high training rates among these workers (training in the main task concerns more than 80% of workers in these high-skill occupations). A more tentative explanation may be that these workers, due to their initial skills, learn more quickly so that training investments are profitable even for shorter career horizons.
To summarize, we find that older workers in lower occupations (namely, clerks and bluecollar workers) have reduced access to certain types of training in firms that use new technologies. But the results also show that such a bias against older workers' training is far from systematic: we don't find the same evidence for older managers and technicians/supervisors, and there is no evidence that new organizational practices are unfavorable to training older workers in any occupational groups.
Limitations of the analysis so far have to do with selection, measurement, and the distinction between impacts on computer use and on computer training. First, as shown by AUBERT et al.
[2006], technical and organizational changes have adverse employment effects on older workers: more advanced firms recruit fewer of them and dismiss them more frequently. This gives rise to a selection problem: if older workers in more advanced firms are selected along unobserved characteristics that impact training, the estimates of the training equations are biased. Second, measuring the cluster of practices and tools that define advanced firms involves choices, which makes it useful to check the robustness of the results to alternative measures. Last, we have so far grouped workers who do not use computers with workers who use computers without specific training, such that a refinement involves separating the two.
The rest of this section addresses these three issues in turn.
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Workers' selection
Using the employer section of the COI survey matched with administrative firm data on employment and worker flows, AUBERT et al. [2006] show that technological and organizational changes reduce the employment of older workers. However, we cannot use the same (firm-level) data in order to control for selection in our (individual-level) training equations. To deal with the omitted variable bias that the selection may induce, we therefore use an alternative approach relying on proxy variables. We use the two proxies presented in Section 2 as controls in the training equations.
Before presenting the augmented selection equations, it is useful to check whether our proxies indeed seem to be related to the selection of older workers in more advanced firms. We estimate the following "selection equation":
where proxy is one of the two proxies (either the attachment to private sector employment, or Table 2 presents the results estimated separately for each proxy and for each occupational group. As shown in panel A, older clerks and blue-collar workers employed in firms that use more advanced technologies have more favorable characteristics than younger ones. Concerning attachment to employment, the interaction coefficients are positive and significant for workers above age 40. Concerning the wage fixed effect, they are significant only for workers aged 40-49, but the lack of significance at age 50-59 may be due to the smaller sample size (indeed, the point estimate at age 50-59 is very close to the coefficient at age 40-49). The effects are sizeable: older clerks and blue-collar workers employed in firms where Comp is one standard deviation higher used to earn 20% higher wages at their previous employers'. By contrast, there is no evidence of specific selection of older workers among clerks and blue-collar workers in firms that use new organizational practices more intensely, and no more evidence of selection among managers and technicians/supervisors in firms with more advanced technology and organizational practices. To summarize, the results of the selection equation are somewhat mixed. Concerning managers and technicians/supervisors, 15/37 the proxies do not seem to capture a different treatment of older workers in more advanced firms, but they do for clerks and blue-collar workers in firms that use more advanced technologies. They can therefore be used to control for selection bias in these occupations, which serves our purposes since it is for clerks and blue-collar workers that the training equations yield the stronger results. We believe that a measure of the complexity of IT is more relevant. Overall, however, our main result is robust to the choice of the IT measure.
Computer use and computer training
We have considered so far that workers who do not use computers do not receive training in computer skills, and we have grouped them with workers who declare that they use computers without receiving specific training. In order to interpret our results further, it is useful to separate computer use and computer training. We consider a multinomial model with three and blue-collar workers (panel A), the probability of not using computers decreases significantly in firms with advanced computerization, except when the worker is above 50.
Symmetrically, the probabilities of using computers with and without training tend to increase below 50, while the increase is smaller and hardly significant concerning computer use without training. And, concerning computer use with training, we again find a sharp contrast between workers above and below 50: the probability increases significantly for younger ones, but it tends to decrease for older workers. It thus appears that there is a specific disadvantage of older clerks and blue-collar workers with regard to computer training (rather than to computer use solely). A tentative interpretation is that older workers' disadvantage is related to advanced uses of computers that require specific training rather than to simple uses that do not involve specific training. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that our
Comp variable measures the implementation of advanced IT in the firm. The last two columns of panel A display naive probit estimations for comparison purposes, and the second probit model confirms that, among computer users, the implementation of advanced IT in the firm significantly reduces the probability that older workers receive computer training.
Concerning managers and technicians/supervisors, older workers do not distinguish themselves from younger ones. The probability of not using computers declines similarly for workers aged 40-49 and 50-59 in firms with advanced computerization. Moreover, the probability of using computers and receiving training increases similarly in those two groups (although not significantly at conventional levels).
Overall, this decomposition confirms the specificity of older clerks and blue-collar workers with regard to computer training. The difference is not simply due to the fact that they do not need computers in their tasks, as the probability of receiving training in computer skills tends to decline after 50, even among computer users.
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Discussion
Our main finding is that older clerks and blue collars receive significantly less training in firms that have adopted advanced IT, compared to what the main effects of age and IT would separately predict. But we do not find any negative age effect in the case of training to the main task, while results on training in teamwork are not fully robust. Moreover, we do not find any disadvantage for older workers when firms implement new organizational practices.
These findings give empirical support to the hypothesis of age-biased technical change caused by a comparative disadvantage of some older workers to some forms of training. The fact that the age bias does not appear for high-skill workers nor when firms implement organizational change is interesting. It suggests that the bias is due to accelerated skill obsolescence for the particular group of low-skill older workers. Indeed, if it was due to a systematic inability of older workers to work and learn skills in a changing environment, it should also be evident in firms with innovative organizational practices (that include multitasking, job rotation, etc.). If it was due to the shortness of the older workers' horizon to get the return from training investments, training incidence would not rise in response to organizational change. Our results rather suggest that the age bias is caused by a problem that specifically impacts older low-skill workers in the context of technological change. Accelerated skill obsolescence and difficulties to learn computer skills is a plausible explanation. Older workers in the nineties were educated in a world without computers, and may thus lack the computer literacy required for work on complex IT systems and for further computer training. If they are in lowskill occupations, they also likely lack the general skills that could help to overcome this difficulty.
There is another possible interpretation why the training responses to technical change among older workers (in lower occupations) are different than the response to organizational change.
It could be that organizational changes require a firm-wide program (and therefore firm-wide training) whereas IT training can be highly individual. This would explain why we observe significant age effects in computer training and not in training to the main task. 7 To further 7 We also find negative age effects for training in teamwork among clerks and blue-collars (though the effect is less robust than for computer training: see tables 3 and 4). Despite the fact that teamwork has a collective dimension, this is not inconsistent with a distinction between individual and firm-wide training. Firms can be selective in their choice of whom is leading the teamwork and therefore gets the training (in our sample, less than 20% of workers have received training in teamwork).
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investigate this possibility, we would need data with larger samples of workers in each firm.
Note that it were true, it would reinforce our findings in favor of the age-bias hypothesis. 
Data Appendix
The main data source is the COI survey (Changement organizationnel et informatisation, 
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Measures of new organizational practices and of computerization
The firm-level questionnaire asks a set of questions that focus on different features of the use of IT and new organizational practices. This information has to be synthesized to uncover the underlying technological or organizational latent variable. We rely on multiple correspondence analyses to synthesize information, using the measures built in GREENAN AND MAIRESSE [2006] . Our computerization index in 1997 is given by the firms' coordinate on this first factor.
Symmetrically, the use of new organizational practices is measured through an analysis using 15 variables with 2 to 4 items in 1997. Table A6 gives their distribution and indicates variables that have been estimated in 1994. As for computer use, new organizational practices cluster on the first factor of the correspondence analysis: firms using just-in time practices, total productive maintenance, and value analysis, and with a complex structure, are opposed to firms with a simple structure having no just in time practices and no quality certification.
The organization index in 1997 is built as in the computer use case, from the coordinates of firms and weights of items on this first factor (see last column of table A6).
Training Incidence
The questions used to measure access to training are the following:
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Q25. In addition to your initial training, did your firm provide you with specific training in This calls for two remarks. First, most questions only measure access to training through training incidence. However, a rough measure of training intensity (more or less than three days) is available for computer training. We checked that training profiles are qualitatively not modified when we count as training only the sessions that last more than three days.
Second, the questions do not specify the period in which the training session has occurred.
Presumably, the period considered is longer for older workers. This requires that we control for seniority (tenure at the current employer) in the training equations.
Frequency of early retirement
Early Source: COI survey, employer section (SESSI, SCEES) and employee section (DARES), 1997. Note: Probit models (marginal effects evaluated at sample mean). Standard errors are computed using the delta method. They are robust to cluster effects between workers of the same firm. Marginal effects are very similar when computed as the average of individual marginal effects over the sample. Controls for composition effects in model (2): tenure, education interacted with age group, firm size interacted with age group, frequency of early retirement in the industry, and plant's localization (rural dummy).
28/37 Source: COI survey, employer section (SESSI, SCEES) and employee section (DARES), 1997; DADS panel, 1976-96 . Note: OLS models. Controls in model (2): tenure, education interacted with age group, firm size interacted with age group, frequency of early retirement in the industry, and plant's localization (rural dummy). 1997; DADS panel, 1976-96 . Note: Probit models (marginal effects evaluated at sample mean). Standard errors are computed using the delta method. They are robust to cluster effects between workers of the same firm. Marginal effects are very similar when computed as the average of individual marginal effects over the sample. Controls for composition effects (tenure, education interacted with age group, firm size interacted with age group, frequency of early retirement in the industry, and plant's localization -rural) and selection effects (individual wage fixed effect, interacted with age group; attachment to employment indicator, interacted with age group; and indicator that a proxy has been imputed, interacted with age group).
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30/37 Source: COI survey, employer section (SESSI, SCEES) and employee section (DARES), 1997. Note: Probit models (marginal effects evaluated at sample mean). Standard errors are computed using the delta method. They are robust to cluster effects between workers of the same firm. Marginal effects are very similar when computed as the average of individual marginal effects over the sample. Controls for composition effects (tenure, education interacted with age group, firm size interacted with age group, frequency of early retirement in the industry, and plant's localization -rural) and selection effects (individual wage fixed effect, interacted with age group; attachment to employment indicator, interacted with age group; and indicator that a proxy has been imputed, interacted with age). The measures of new organizational practices and computerization follow Aubert et al. [2006] . 31/37 Source: COI survey, employer section (SESSI, SCEES) and employee section (DARES), 1997. Note: Nested logit models (average predicted impacts of a 1 standard-deviation increase in the Orga and Comp variables, standard errors computed by bootstrap) and probit models (marginal effects evaluated at sample mean). Controls for composition effects (age group, tenure, education interacted with age group, firm size interacted with age group, frequency of early retirement in the industry, and plant's localization -rural) and selection effects (individual wage fixed effect, interacted with age group; attachment to employment indicator, interacted with age group; and indicator that a proxy has been imputed, interacted with age). Allocate tasks to production workers 6.4
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Participate in performance improvements 6.7
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